This project is an accomplishment based renewal extending the researcher's past work on rational behavior in institutional settings. The research focuses the bases of conflict and cooperation and how they change over time. Traditional understandings emphasize that these bases are derived from social, economic or spatial cleavages. These cleavages animate studies of bargaining, collective action, alliances and coalition formation. Non-cooperative game theory has produced sophisticated tools with which to model many of these instances of conflict and cooperation. However, much of formal theory that has turned toward understanding these subjects has been static and cross-sectional. A snapshot at any particular point in time reveals the fault lines in a group, committee, or entire society. However, it fails to reveal the long-term interests that lead to conflict or cooperation and the strategic interests that unfold over time. This work models various indicators of time (like `age`) that allow a more nuanced consideration of the impact of time on rational behavior in institutional and social life. This work has implications for many time dependent processes, including: the distribution of rewards, responsibilities, and incentives in the workplace, changing life expectancy, demographic bubbles and shocks, attitudes toward retirement, term limits and age discrimination.
