This project tests whether leaders of democratic polities confront uniquely strong constraints on their ability to use force abroad. In particular, the investigator will examine whether the existence of elections and opposition parties influences the use of military power abroad. To do so, she will use both game-theoretic and econometric methods of analysis. The importance of the project inheres in its potential to clarify the relationship between polities and peace. A large and growing literature argues that a democratic peace prevails-that is, that the incidence of wars and other militarized disputes is much lower between democracies than between members of other country pairs. One argument advanced to explain the democratic peace is that domestic constraints on leaders (including periodic elections and competitive parties) are stronger in democracies than in nondemocracies. Investigating this hypothesis using U.S. data, however, the investigator did not find evidence that was completely consistent with it. To extend this analysis to other countries, the investigator needs to be able to use game-theoretic and econometric methods of analyses more fluently. This award will enable her to retool so that she can extend her research to the next level of analysis and maintain her leadership role in the field of international relations.
