On Election Day, poll workers must operate a complex system composed of people, processes, and technology. Even minor mistakes in the operation of the system can lead to security failures, which could in turn lead to the wrong candidates being selected. However, pollworkers are generally not technically astute, receive minimal training, are not attuned to systems and security issues, and are prone to making security mistakes that endanger elections, especially towards the end of the day due to worker fatigue.
This project studies how poll workers manage voting technology at the opening and closing of polls on Election Day in an effort to understand the impact poll workers have on voting system security. In particular, it will examine what kinds of common security problems do poll workers encounter in opening/closing the polls; why do these problems seem to occur and their likely causes; and if there are particular points in poll/opening/closing where poll workers are more likely to encounter security issues or make mistakes.
The project reveals opportunities for deeper investigation of security gaps in poll workers? setting up and shutting down the polls that may be remedied by better design of procedures, job aids, training and content available in the polling place.
This project, Poll Workers and Election Security, (http://civicdesign.org/projects/pollworkers-security/) was designed to explore how polling place observation could be used to improve election security by identifying issues poll workers face on Election Day. We carried out our observations in a number of polling places across the United States in 2012 and 2013, with special attention to the key periods immediately preceding Election Day (polling place set-up, or "opening") and immediately after the close of polls (polling place shutdown, or "closing"). The primary outcome of this project was a heightened understanding of how difficult it is for poll workers to close the polls at the end of the day, and how most jurisdictions’ training and documentation are not set up to assist workers with this vital task – which creates security vulnerabilities given that poll closing involves managing voted ballots pre- and post-tabulation. In light of those observations, we developed some preliminary best practices for local election offices to improve their poll workers’ readiness for this crucial task. We also identified opportunities for future research into improving the usability of poll closing materials, which will improve election security by reducing opportunities for confusion and error as poll workers close the polls at the end of Election Day. The full report is available at http://civicdesign.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Pollworkers-and-security-2014-1018c.pdf.
