The objective of this study is to elaborate upon recent theories of efficiency wages. The conditions under which workers shirk are examined and the alternative social and organizational models for motivating labor effort are analyzed. The principal thesis is that social and organizational regimes are more significant than wage compensation schemes as incentives to promote work effort. Alternative models are developed in four areas--organizational and managerial, paternalism, kinship, and legitimacy. The nature of labor supervision and various efficiency compensation regimes are also examined. The research takes an inductive, in contrast to a deductive, approach to theory, where the models are supported by data from business histories, management case studies, industrial relations research, anthropological studies of family and kinship, and industrial sociology, as well as original field research. The significance of this project is that it identifies conditions under which alternatives to simple wage differentials can be used to motivate workers to work more effectively and, thus, to be more productive in the work place. The principal investigator's previous work has been very influential over a broad spectrum both of labor economics and macroeconomics. This project builds on some of his previous work, and there is every reason to believe that this study will be successfully undertaken.
