Memory works most of the time. Unfortunately, memory also fails us at times. While it is now virtually uncontested that false memories can and do occur, it is unclear exactly how and why they emerge. Mazzoni, Loftus and Kirsch (2001) have recently proposed a three-step model for the development of false memories. According to the model, 1) an event must be seen as plausible; 2) one must obtain a personal belief that the event likely occurred to him/her; and 3) one must interpret thoughts and fantasies about the event as memories. The proposed work explores how belief in a plausible (e.g., bitten by a snake) or implausible (e.g., shaking hand with the President) general topic can be enhanced and then transformed into a personal memory. Six experiments are proposed in which subjects come to believe or disbelieve that they have experienced a variety of events as children, based on the way in which they process those events. It is hypothesized that the probability that an individual comes to believe that an event occurred in his/her past depends on the ease with which the event is initially processed or experienced. Moreover, it is proposed that errors in attribution are responsible for false memory. Finally, it is suggested that a single, general process underlies both belief and autobiographical memory. The proposed work will help clarify the relationship between belief and memory, thereby delineating some of the mechanisms responsible for false memory.
| Bernstein, Daniel M; Rudd, Michael E; Erdfelder, Edgar et al. (2009) The revelation effect for autobiographical memory: a mixture-model analysis. Psychon Bull Rev 16:463-8 |
| Bernstein, Daniel M; Loftus, Geoffrey R; Meltzoff, Andrew N (2005) Object identification in preschool children and adults. Dev Sci 8:151-61 |
| Bernstein, Daniel M; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K et al. (2005) False beliefs about fattening foods can have healthy consequences. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102:13724-31 |
| Bernstein, Daniel M; Godfrey, Ryan D; Davison, Arienne et al. (2004) Conditions affecting the revelation effect for autobiographical memory. Mem Cognit 32:455-62 |
