Moral judgment depends on an assessment of internal mental states such as beliefs, intentions, and motivations, and not just external, observable actions. Thus, forming moral judgments of other people and interacting with them requires reasoning about their minds--a capacity known as theory of mind. For example, judging the morality of an action requires questions such as "Did she INTEND to poison his coffee, or did she THINK it was sugar?" Prior work has examined the role of theory of mind for moral judgment for some contexts, such as distinguishing intentional from accidental harms when people make judgments regarding third-party interactions. However, people are not mere observers. People are active participants in the social world; they consider the minds of their social partners with whom they are interacting. Theory of mind processes may differ in important ways for an active participant in an interaction. Understanding theory of mind in contexts where individuals' goals involve social connection and coordination versus strife and social distance may be of particular societal importance. For example, in a process called dehumanization, individuals distance themselves from being aware of others as thinking, feeling agents with intentions and minds. Research suggests people may dehumanize the enemy to justify their own aggression, either before aggressing or after the fact. Thus existing research reveals the importance of theory of mind for moral judgment, and it also provides clues that theory of mind might be modulated by social context. The current work addresses a key gap in theory of mind research, by examining systematically how theory of mind is deployed for social interaction in two distinct motivational contexts--competition and cooperation. This project uses methodological and theoretical approaches from social, cognitive and developmental psychology and neuroscience. Investigating the early emergence of differences in social cognition for competition versus cooperation and the underlying neural mechanisms will provide insight for scholars and policy makers into the scale and nature of the problems at hand. Ultimately, understanding social cognition across motivational contexts will shed light on societal problems, from political disagreement to ethnic discord.
The investigators consider three fundamental questions about the role of theory of mind in social interaction across motivational contexts. First, do distinct neural mechanisms support theory of mind for competition versus cooperation? Second, do distinct developmental trajectories underlie theory of mind across these contexts? Third, what are the social consequences of these differences for intergroup conflict, such as whether people support diplomatic efforts? The research will use functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural processes in typically developing adults and adults with autism, a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by difficulties with social interaction. To track the developmental trajectories, the research will apply novel paradigms to typically developing children between 3 and 5 years of age, an age group associated with emerging theory of mind capacities. To investigate the social consequences of possible differences in theory of mind processes and to test the impact of an intervention, the research will examine existing groups in society with a history of conflict. By integrating social psychological, developmental, and cognitive neuroscientific methods, the project aims to provide a comprehensive account of how theory of mind operates in real and consequential contexts of social interaction. In addition, testing whether cognitive impairments are associated with an inability to distinguish between these contexts will also advance our understanding of the cognitive capacities that enable most people to be able to make such distinctions. Finally, the research may provide preliminary guidance on how situations of potential intergroup conflict may be reduced via theory of mind processes.
