Designing a constitution involves one of the most critical and complex series of explicit decisions that a society can confront. Should the government be presidential or parliamentary; should it have a two-house or single-chamber legislature; should there be any differences in the powers of the chambers of a bicameral legislature; should representation be territorial or by proportional representation; what role should the courts play in constitutional interpretation; what provisions should be included for emergencies; what authority should be given to local and regional governments; what rights properly belong in a constitution? Large and ethnically heterogeneous states confront an additional series of questions, including: Should the country be federal or unitary, and if it is federal, should its constituent parts have the right to secede, to veto legislation, or to nullify federal law on their territories? These last questions are important not only because they influence the operation and stability of a state after it has formed, but also, as in the case of countries such as Russia and Ukraine, they can influence whether a viable constitution can be written and implemented in the first place. With various republics and regions of Russia, for example, claiming autonomy, sovereignty, and even independence and secession, it may not be possible to implement a constitution that does not provide for the right to secession. Unfortunately, we do not know very much empirically or theoretically about the implications of including a secession right in a constitution. Nor do we know the extent to which other provisions, such as allowing subunits the right to veto or nullification. Which device (secession, veto, nullification) provides a constituent unit of a federalism the greatest guarantee against violation of its rights and which, if any, fosters the development of a mutually beneficial federal state? This research investigation explores such questions by drawing a theoretical parallel between federations and alliances in international political systems. The rationale for this parallel is that alliances, like federations, must be consummated and maintained on a wholly voluntary basis. As such, alliances contain within them the right to secession and veto (and, in some instances, nullification). At the same time, in joining an alliance, each member must relinquish some of its sovereignty to a central, coordinating agent, or at least state a verbal (but possibly non-enforceable) agreement to do so. By developing some common ideas and theoretical principles, the researchers hope to show how alliances and federations operate under the same principles and how the properties of unstable alliances parallel and are different from stable and unstable federations. Finally, by looking at alliances, it is possible to gain a clearer view of the way in which the right of secession might operate in a constitutional democracy.
