A theory of values and their measurement will be developed on the basis of two distinctions among types of values: protected values vs. well-behaved values, and fundamental vs. proxy values. Protected values, in contrast to well behaved values, resist tradeoffs with other values and concern means rather than ends. For example, some people think that destruction of species by logging should be stopped at any cost. Proxy values are stand-ins for fundamental values, to which they are related through beliefs (often uncertain). For example, percent of children vaccinated is a proxy for disease prevention, to which it is related by beliefs about vaccine effectiveness. These distinctions can help us understand inconsistency in measurement of values for environmental amenities and government policies. Two types of inconsistency involve insensitivity to quantity (e.g., insensitivity to range in assigning relative weights to attributes, quantity insensitivity in contingent valuation), and nonconsequential principles that lead to different valuations of identical outcomes achieved by different means (e.g., use of cost rather than benefit in contingent valuation, omission bias). Hypotheses regarding the sources of these inconsistencies will be tested by examining the effects of: fundamental vs. proxy values; information relating proxy to fundamental values; manipulations of the measurement task to bring subjects' approach in line with its purpose; and combinations of these manipulations. It will also be determined whether increased consistency within each of two measures will increase agreement between them. This project is supported by the EPA/NSF Valuation for Environmental Policy funding opportunity.
