This Grant for Rapid Response Research (RAPID) will focus on studying the integration of evacuees from the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti into life in Florida. Researchers and policymakers have been concerned about how to manage hazards in large cities, but few have considered the likely effects of a catastrophe away from the impacted urban area. The catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans resulted in hundreds of thousands of people becoming displaced from their homes for months, years, or even permanently; while the communities to which they had fled or to which they were transported had no guidance to prepare for or respond to the mass influx of these evacuees. This situation was virtually unprecedented in US history, leaving the emergency management community and the political systems it supports with no appropriate plans, legal instruments, policies, or pre-considered options available to deal with the magnitude of the situation. Apart from challenges to officials, the unpredictable and faltering housing and social-service initiatives resulted in additional stress and anguish for evacuees. Now, the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti stands as one of the preeminent catastrophes in this hemisphere in recorded history, resulting in tens of thousands of internally and internationally displaced refugees. This disaster foreshadows what could be experienced when large numbers of people are forced to travel far from their places of residence for assistance after a catastrophe.
In this project, focusing on the Haiti earthquake, researchers will study how organizations: (1) identified and prioritized evacuees? needs as they traveled to the United States for assistance; ( 2) assessed the availability of resources to meet those needs; and (3) administered both public and private aid systems, including new or emergent ones. This research particularly focuses on the administrative impediments that arise from inconsistent regulations, disconnected or conflicting procedures between agencies, or pre-existing administrative structures that are tested by unusual requests. Findings from this study will inform policy makers who need to improve capacities for assisting people who have escaped disaster. There is a sizable risk for catastrophic earthquakes in several areas of the United States, including on the West Coast and in the Midwest. This work should provide needed guidance for US emergency planners in potential host regions to better accommodate evacuees by enhancing interagency emergency planning and facilitating interactions between and among public officials, government agencies, non-profit entities, and emergent organizations.
The January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti stands as one of the preeminent catastrophes in this hemisphere in recorded history, showing the significance of the intersection of geologic forces with high levels of social and physical vulnerability. Scholars and public officials have been concerned about how to manage hazards in large cities, but few have considered the likely effects of a catastrophe away from the impacted urban area. Events in Haiti and the corresponding involvement of other places, foreshadow what could be experienced when large numbers of people are internally displaced by a catastrophe or forced to seek refuge internationally. This project focused on the challenges facing public and private organizations in accommodating tens of thousands of Haitian-Americans and Haitian citizens who traveled to the United States to seek new housing, critical medical services, and other forms of social, psychological/spiritual, medical, or legal support. Typically, the needs of disaster evacuees (especially those without means) extend across multiple agencies before they enter the private market, faith-and community-based organizations, and public social service sector. In order to gather data on the experience of agencies and organizations that responded to this influx of evacuees to the US, the researchers identified and traveled to relevant locations to learn how organizations: (1) identified and prioritized evacuees’ needs; (2) assessed the availability of resources to meet those needs; and (3) administered both public and private aid systems, including new or emergent ones. The project in particular is interested in the administrative impediments that arise in the United States from inconsistent regulations, disconnected or conflicting procedures between agencies, or pre-existing administrative structures whose operating assumptions are tested by unusual requests and needs. Findings from this study, including identifying procedural impediments to the smooth reception and care of evacuees in host cities, will inform policy makers desiring to improve system capacities for assisting people who have become displaced disaster victims. Given the sizable risk for catastrophic earthquakes in several areas of the United States, this work should provide guidance for emergency planners in potential host regions for accommodating evacuees better, by (1) enhancing interagency emergency plans, and (2) facilitating interactions between and among public officials and non-profit and emergent organizations who are often stymied by each others’ operational protocols or the requirements for creative problem-solving and decision making. Results from this study will be presented to emergency management and political decision makers at professional meetings; researchers at academic meetings and professional journals; and students through the inclusion of findings in graduate and undergraduate courses and curricula. In particular, the research showed: Organizations involved in the Emergency Repatriation Center's (ERC’s) reported the importance of prior experience and, for the most part, familiarity with each other. With respect to prior experiences, most referred to dealing with invacuees from Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans. With the exception of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE ) and the Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), many of these organizations and agencies have worked together following all major natural disasters in the state of Florida. Organizations also reported the usefulness of the Incident Command System, a national-level organizational structure for managing disasters. For example, according to one airport official: "The airport is part of the Incident Command System (ICS), giving the airport an established network that was in place. Really, there was not a plan made before to handle this situation. The airport works from an Incident Action Plan, which is part of the ICS. This plan is flexible and adapts to the situation. The airport used a unified command system and implemented components of ICS in the Incident Action Plan." Organizations reported the lack of a federal lead agency as introducing ambiguity. Our research suggests that there were multiple federal 'lead' agencies including the Department of Homeland Security (for immigration and national security issues), Health and Human Services (for public health emergency), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (as a response to a large-scale natural disaster for mass care), and the State of Florida (for refugee disembarkation management and humanitarian crisis response). Organizations reported particular challenges in meeting evacuee needs because of uncertain, conflicting, or erroneous information regarding number and destination of flights and the needs of disembarked evacuees. For example, one after action report stated: "There were no parameters established to indicate how long the site would be operational, or the number of flights, passengers or arrival times. Leadership prepared for a multi-day operation; however were soon required to extend those plans for a sustained operation. Given the disastrous circumstances in Port Au Prince, Haiti, initial intelligence about arrival times and passengers was unreliable. Local NGOs often reported facing challenges in providing assistance to non-citizen invacuees. Economic conditions in Florida were negatively affecting the ability of Haitian-American families in the US to assist the invacuees as sponsors, especially since the need to send money to other family members in Haiti was so critical.
