The objective of this Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) Program award is the design, study and implementation of algorithms and matching mechanisms for kidney exchange and other matching markets. In the last decade the field of market design has been growing rapidly, attracting economists, operations researchers and computer scientists. The emergence of kidney exchange clearinghouses is one of the successes of this field. The need for kidney exchange arises when someone who wishes to donate a kidney to a particular recipient is incompatible with that recipient. Two or more incompatible pairs can participate in an exchange allowing the patients to receive transplants. The growth of kidney exchange clearinghouses has driven novel theory based on empirical evidence, leading to impact on existing mechanisms. However, the growth is still slow leaving many more questions than answers. Long term efficiency in kidney exchange will be studied with emphasis on developing and analyzing dynamic mechanisms driven by data. As many exchanges fail to take place in practice (due to hospitals? preferences and medical issues), to reduce failures as well as developing mechanisms that will increase efficiency in the presence of such failures will be investigated. The potential growth of kidney exchange will be studied, from merging exchange networks (domestically and internationally) to relaxing current constraints such as conducting exchanges simultaneously. Finally, unresolved issues in driven by actual challenges in other matching markets will be investigated.
There are over 92,000 patients on the waiting list for cadaver kidneys in the U.S and there is a severe shortage of kidneys for transplant; In 2011, 33,581 patients were added to the waiting list, 11,026 transplants from cadaver and 5,154 transplants from living donors were performed, 4,700 patients died and 2,466 were "Too Sick to Transplant". Kidney exchange is therefore a growing source for living donation. Expanding kidney exchange will help many people.
