Denial of service attacks flood a web-site with so many requests that it can no longer respond. Computers connected to the Internet are vulnerable to being used unwittingly in mounting a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on a victim web-site. Past countermeasures based on software patches or re-compilation are often ignored by users, leaving many systems vulnerable. This research first proposes a classification of the various denial of service attacks and countermeasures, then defines architectural solutions in the core (non-optional) hardware and software of future machines.
The vulnerabilities of computers, which allow DDoS attack networks to be set up, are studied. Low overhead architectural features in the core hardware of computers are investigated which hinder attack networks from being set up in the first place, or detect and prevent the execution of potentially hostile code. Malicious parties often employ buffer overflow attacks to gain entry to a computer by corrupting procedure return addresses. This research investigates features like a secure return address stack (SRAS) in the processor architecture as a new defense against such buffer overflow exploits. The proposed research approach is unique in providing defenses in the client platforms rather than only in the servers or routers, and in building more trusted architecture in the core hardware, rather than only in software layers. Since application code need not be changed nor re-compiled, both legacy and future software can enjoy the security benefits of hardware architectural solutions. Since DDoS attacks pose a serious threat to the availability of critical Internet services, this research can contribute to the overall security of the Internet while increasing the trust that owners may have in their interconnected information appliances.