0917008: TC: Small: Denial-of-Service Attacks and Counter Measures in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
This project studies denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that are unique to dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks: (a) DoS attacks by incumbent user emulation; (b) DoS attacks by protocol manipulation. In the first case, one or more malicious nodes pretend to be the primary by mimicking the power and/or signal characteristics to deceive legitimate secondary nodes into vacating the white space unnecessarily. In the second case, the malicious users either modify spectrum sensing related information or falsify their own sensing data thereby affecting the final decision. A number of mathematical models for the DoS attacks and several counter measures based on game theory, decision theory, stochastic learning, cryptography and Byzantine fault tolerance are developed in this project. Some defense mechanisms and protocols developed through this project will be tested on SpiderRadio (a cognitive radio test-bed being developed in the PIs? laboratory).
Broader Impact: Since DSA networks are expected to play an important role in first responder networks, the solutions proposed here are expected to impact design of such networks. Since research in DSA network protocols and architectures are still in the formative stages, the proposed security solutions can be incorporated into the design phase of the system rather than being added on as an after thought.
Graduate and undergraduate level courses and Technogenesis scholarships will be used to disseminate the finding of this project. Special efforts will be taken to mentor women and minority students via established connections.
