Only two number-theoretic assumptions --- hardness of factoring and of computing discrete logarithms --- underlie essentially all public-key cryptosystems in widespread use today. For lower-level primitives such as hash functions, random number generators, and stream ciphers, the situation is even worse: existing provably-secure constructions are too inefficient to compete with practical alternatives such as SHA-1 or AES, and so the primitives in use today have no rigorous justification for their security.

This research will investigate new classes of computational assumptions based on lattices. Based on these assumptions, the investigators will seek to design cryptographic primitives that are both provably secure and comparably efficient to existing, deployed schemes. The research will explore the use of lattices to construct basic cryptographic primitives, including hash functions, pseudorandom generators, shared-key authentication protocols, public-key encryption schemes (including those secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks), and digital signatures. The educational component of this work will focus on educating graduate students as well as developing introductory-level surveys of lattice-based cryptography.

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Computer and Network Systems (CNS)
Application #
1042585
Program Officer
Nina Amla
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
2010-02-01
Budget End
2011-08-31
Support Year
Fiscal Year
2010
Total Cost
$82,134
Indirect Cost
Name
Georgia Tech Research Corporation
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
Atlanta
State
GA
Country
United States
Zip Code
30332