The proliferation of wireless technology constitutes one of the most remarkable success stories in the history of human intervention. This growth however raises the question of whether technology will capitulate to its own success owing to the scarcity of spectrum. Fortunately the problem is more artificial than fundamental: the scarcity has been precipitated by the exclusive licensing model, while large swaths of licensed spectrum remain underutilized. A conjecture therefore is that unlicensed access of idle (but licensed) spectrum, commonly referred to as secondary spectrum access, can help avert the impending crisis. This however can only be realized if secondary access is profitable for the license holders. This is the main motivation behind this research, which seeks to design incentives to induce license holders to allow secondary access. Specifically, the research studies a free secondary market where the licensed and unlicensed users trade access rights based on bilateral agreements, and seek to optimize their interaction strategies. The resulting decision problems are analyzed using tools from game theory, optimization, graph theory and stochastic control.
The profit perspective adopted in this research incentivizes greater participation of wireless carriers in the secondary markets, enabling a quantum leap in more efficient spectrum utilization. Students at both undergraduate and graduate levels are trained in subjects from wireless technology to game theory and optimization theory. This research will generate algorithms for computing the decision strategies of the license holders. They will be evaluated through rigorous analysis and extensive simulations. Results will be disseminated through conferences and journals.
