Emerging Resistive Random-Access Memory (ReRAM) may replace flash-based Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) technology in future. Unfortunately, ReRAM technology may introduce new security vulnerabilities. This proposal will investigate the security implications of ReRAM-based NVMs in computing systems and how to structure secure-by-design ReRAM-based memories.
This project will investigate security implications of ReRAM, and develop countermeasures against ReRAM side-channel information leakage. The project has three thrusts. The first thrust aims to understand the potential information leakage in such emerging technologies. The second thrust will focus on innovating architectural support to eliminate potential side-channel information leakage. The third thrust will concentrate on system software level solutions.
The project will involve training of graduate and undergraduate students and will make an effort towards involving undergraduate and minority students in research. Outreach activities are planned through social media and the Orlando Science center.
The project data will be stored in repository maintained in https://stars.library.ucf.edu/memristor-based-memories. The data, models, and simulators will be maintained for at least five years after the project ends.
This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
