To what extent is science a rational activity? Why are scientific theories accepted at one time and then replaced by another theory at another time? Why is theory change justified? What is the difference between science and pseudoscience? What, in fact, is the aim of science? These questions are at the heart of the philosophy of science. Increasingly, however, these questions are no longer the exclusive concern of scientists, science policy makers, and historians and philosophers of science. They are being argued in churches, school boards, and even in federal court rooms as new challenges like "Creationism" attack the traditional teaching of science. Dr. Maher is undertaking a major study of these issues in order to determine how decision theory can be used to make progress on these questions. In his study, he will examine critically the very influential views of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn on scientific change. This critique will involve a new representation theorem for probabilities and utilities and will offer new explanations of features of scientific method such as the importance of prediction as opposed to mere accommodation of evidence and the value of simplicity and unity in theories. He will show that a notion of acceptance which is not reducible to probability is needed to account for central features of scientific method such as the gathering of evidence and the search for explanations. He will also show that this notion of acceptance provides the basis for an account of the role of values in science. This notion will be used in particular to give precise meaning to the idea of science is to try to determine the truth about the nature of the physical world. This study is of great importance not only for philosophy of science but also for assistance in the wider arena in which these issues are now debated.
