Recent developments on Stackelberg Games and Incentive Strategies are adapted to develop a novel decomposition approach for the solution of dynamic optimization problems. The approach involves stage-wise decomposition, and stems from the following observation: "In the dynamic programming approach to optimization, if the cost-to-go functions at every stage were known, then the solution of an N-stage optimal control problem would be obtained by solving (in parallel) N decoupled static (single stage) optimization problems." Taking this observation as a starting point, the principal investigators suggest that even if the optimal cost-to-go functions are not known, one can start with some initial guesses, solve the corresponding N static optimization problems, update on the initial guesses using these solutions, solve a new set of optimization problems,...and so on..., until some convergence is achieved. The research is to study various aspects of this scheme, including its convergence properties, computational requirements, and feasibility, and apply it to an economic dispatch problem arising in power systems.

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Electrical, Communications and Cyber Systems (ECCS)
Type
Standard Grant (Standard)
Application #
8513163
Program Officer
Kristen M. Biggar, N-BioS
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
1985-09-01
Budget End
1988-10-31
Support Year
Fiscal Year
1985
Total Cost
$61,416
Indirect Cost
Name
University of Connecticut
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
Storrs
State
CT
Country
United States
Zip Code
06269