The purposes of this study are to increase knowledge about standard setting in the telecommunications and computer industries and to contribute to the development of the body of theory on standard setting. The study employs a taxonomy that divides standard setting into classes based on (a) the extent to which there are strong interests in promoting the adoption of any universal standard and (b) whether there are vested interests in the adoption of a particular standard. This gives rise to a classification in which the possible outcomes are Pure Coordination (where voluntary standards emerge because there is strong interest in adopting a standard and few vested interests), Pure Public Goods (where there are few vested interests but small interest in promoting a standard, so that government intervention may be required), Pure Private Goods (where no agent wants standardization because there are few private benefits and large vested interests), and Conflict (where each agent wants its preferred technology to be the standard). The taxonomy is used to guide case studies that include those involving standards for Open Network Architectures, European telephone systems, data base software, the Unix computer operating system, and electronic mail. The study identifies those factors that determine whether these cases involve Pure Coordination, Pure Public Goods, Pure Private Goods, or Conflict and why different agents may prefer different outcomes. The study will provide important empirical information about the rate of diffusion of new technologies and about the nature of competition in telecommunications and computers. Also, empirical evidence is needed to inform theory development in this relatively new area of inquiry.//
