What explains the variation in party influence in different legislatures? What mechanisms are responsible, and to what degree, for observed levels of partisanship in floor voting? Are variations in preference homogeneity within the parties key, per conditional party government theories (Aldrich and Rohde, 2001)? Are variations in agenda control institutions key, per procedural cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 2004)? Are parties simply unimportant (Krehbiel 1993)? Most studies posing such questions in the American context focus on Congress; but the contemporary Congress exhibits relatively little institutional or preference variation over the postwar period typically studied, when compared to the amount of such variation at the state level. This project seeks to exploit several advantages offered by studying state legislatures. State legislatures exhibit considerable variation in both their internal agenda-settting institutions and their roll call voting patterns. Thus, they offer a potentially attractive sample through which the role of agenda-setting institutions in bringing about .party influence. can be examined. Furthermore, state legislatures offer .natural experiments. in the form of partisan ties, which have occurred with some frequency of late. By studying the impact of partisan ties, and the institutional adaptations associated with them, on roll call voting, this project will investigate the institutional basis of party influence in state legislatures. NSF funding will be used to travel to state capitals and collect the necessary roll call data and/or to interview legislators and staffers involved in negotiating or implementing power-sharing agreements. Intellectual Merit The burgeoning literature on party influence over roll call voting in the states has paid relatively little attention to the institutional sources of such influence. While the debate in Congress has increasingly focused on the role of agenda-setting institutions in bringing about the observed party influence, the lack of institutional variation within the postwar Congress has hampered resolution of theoretical debates. The states offer a natural laboratory in which agenda-setting institutions vary considerably, both across space and time. Likewise, although partisan ties have been relatively common in state legislatures, they have received little scholarly attention, either in themselves or in their possible consequences. This project seeks to fill these gaps. Broader Impact As the first comprehensive study of the power-sharing agreements that have been struck in state legislatures undergoing partisan ties, this research may shed some light on features of those agreements that .work. and others that have been less effective, in the view of the participants (state legislators and staff) themselves.
