SES 0240316 Sylvia Berryman, Ohio State University "Mechanical Explanation in Ancient Greek Philosophy"
This project aims to develop a new characterization of mechanistic explanation in ancient natural philosophy. It has been recognized that the current practice of applying the terms mechanical or mechanistic to characterize ancient natural philosophers is problematic. This project argues that the applicability of the term mechanistic does not depend on necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather on a method of understanding natural processes by analogy to mechanics as that is understood. Understanding the term in this way draws attention to developing ideas about the mechanical art in the ancient world, and the application of these to the understanding of the natural world. An alternative way of characterizing the significance of ancient atomism is offered, namely, the presence of conservationist assumptions about causation. The project begins from an argument to the effect that attempts to define mechanistic conceptions by a single characteristic are wanting. Both the many different ways in which the mechanistic is typically characterized, and the frequency of open-ended lists, indicate that the term refers, at heart, to the use of analogy to the discipline of mechanics as a guide in investigating the functioning of natural processes. As such, the development of mechanistic thought requires a developed mechanical art to serve as a point of reference: comparisons to real working artifacts play a role quite different from that of imaginary conceptions. There is evidence in late antiquity that at least some thinkers adopted the approach that proved influential in the early modern world, namely, the attempt to understand nature as working like constructed devices. This work examines evidence that ideas from the mechanical art were applied to the understanding of natural processes, and that mechanics was understood as a part of natural philosophy. So understood, the term mechanistic has little relevance to understanding ancient atomism. It offers a proposal towards understanding the feature of atomism that has lent credence to this usage: the principle that nothing comes from nothing justifies the assumption that causation ought to be answerable to certain quantitative restrictions. This seems to have developed independently of the idea that nature works like a machine. This proposal aims to develop a new conception of the terms in which the study of ancient natural philosophy is framed, and thereby to help foster philosophical interest in the development of ancient mechanics and its impact on ideas about the understanding of natural processes. It is hoped that this research will help foster the renewed interest among scholars of ancient philosophy in the interactions between the scientific work of the Hellenistic period and philosophical ideas about nature and its explanation.
