This project therefore investigates judicial-legislative interactions in political settings that are likely to induce sophisticated or strategic behavior by the courts, and in doing so addresses complex issues of judicial independence and the rule of law in developed democracies. A strategic account is used to explain when courts defer or not to governments and how governments react to these decisions. The project tests the separation of powers game modeled largely on the basis of the American case in two Westminster parliamentary systems that lack the multiple veto points that hinder political action against American courts. Fewer veto points in Australia and Canada also mean the courts have more complete information about government policy preferences. The project empirically determines the dynamics of judicial-parliamentary interactions over 25-30 year periods in Australia and Canada, through the collection of case-level data for roughly 5500 decisions made by the federal courts of appeals and high courts where the national governments are direct parties in administrative law litigation. Equally important, the project collects archival data on parliamentary reactions to these decisions. The project's longitudinal dimension encourages a neo-institutionalist perspective, while its comparative dimension escapes the limits of case studies of single systems; the quantitative approach permits tests of hypotheses not possible with qualitative data. In addition, the project will provide professional training required for future academic research, and will be used to prepare computer-based "research modules" for undergraduate students for a course taught by the PI. Project findings and results will be submitted to Australian, Canadian, and American peer-reviewed journals after presentation at major political science conferences in these countries. A book-length manuscript based on the project will be submitted to a university press for publication.
