Abstract of SES-0550758: "Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' View of Procedural Justice" Summary: Social science has for some time now recognized the importance of procedural justice i.e., the fairness of the judicial process in predicting participant trust and confidence in judicial systems. Research by Lind & Tyler in the 1980s identified core components of procedural justice, and the doctrine itself has been empirically tested in judicial and business organizational settings. What happens, however, when the adjudicator is not independent i.e., when the person in charge of fact-finding and applying the law is not a neutral party, but instead is employed by the agency and is thus intimately connected to one side of such a dispute? This research will explore whether the independence of a governmental agency adjudicator has a measurable and predictable impact on participant perceptions of fairness in administrative hearings. Importance of the Research Every day and throughout the nation, thousands of citizens will be required to appear in front of some kind of judge. We are most familiar with judges of the judicial branch those whose positions are structurally separated from the executive and legislative branches of government. We expect fairness from these judges and presume their independence. In terms of sheer numbers, however, far more litigants appear before adjudicators who are not part of the judicial branch: they are administrative law judges, hearing examiners, or any number of other designated fact-finders who serve state administrative agencies, like the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Bureau of Workers Compensation. And in about half of the states, these adjudicators are hired by, supervised by, and can be fired by, the agencies for whom they hear cases. The question posed by this research is: does this make a difference to participant perception of fairness? Can we apply the Lind & Tyler paradigm for testing procedural justice to help predict whether agency adjudicators will be perceived as being fair, even though they are part of the agency? Do some structures better facilitate participant perception that the hearing was fair? Questions the Research Will Address This research will look at two kinds of administrative adjudication structures: one, the traditional institutional model, uses adjudicators who are employees of the agency; the other, representing a growing trend, uses adjudicators who are part of the executive branch but are not hired by nor controlled by the agency: they work in a centralized panel of full-time employees who hear cases for any number of different agencies. The questions addressed will be: does it matter to participants (including the citizens, the agencies, the adjudicators, and the lawyers) whether the adjudicator is structurally tied to the agency and is thus not an independent adjudicator? Do the theories of procedural justice, which have been thoroughly tested in the context of independent judicial-branch adjudications, apply as well in the case where the adjudicator is not independent? Are there structural variables that allow predictions about participant perceptions of fairness? How the Research Will Address these Questions Forty-one states currently permit drivers to challenge administrative license suspensions associated with driving while under the influence of alcohol. About half of these states use adjudicators who are employed by the Department of Motor Vehicles; the rest use adjudicators who are part of central panels, not directly tied to the DMV. Through literature review, core fairness indicators will be identified, and research instruments will be created to gather participant perceptions of fairness in these suspension hearings. Using these instruments and applying appropriate statistical tools, the researchers will gather and analyze data from central panel states and non-central panel states to see whether the participants believe the process was fair (as Lind & Tyler and successor analysts have defined fairness). Broader Social Value of the Research The judicial branch of government depends heavily on the delegation of fact-finding to administrative agencies, which explains in part why so many cases are heard by agencies and not by courts. For this delegation to be effective, however, all stakeholders need to have at least a minimum amount of trust and confidence in the fairness of the system. If the central panel adjudicator better serves this need, then executive officers at all levels of government would benefit from knowing this, particularly given the substantial cost savings thats associated with the consolidation of agency adjudicators. If, on the other hand, the public is largely unaffected by the structure of agency adjudicators, then change from the status quo may be unwarranted, in those states that rely on in-house adjudicators. Broader still, however, is the value in exploring whether notions of procedural justice apply in agency adjudications. The more we know how structure affects stakeholder perceptions of fairness, the better equipped we are to develop systems that enjoy the trust and confidence of all participants.
