How do citizens hold their governments accountable? One way is though political institutions such as electoral and party systems. But in many countries, the level of public services provided to citizens ranges enormously at the sub national level. This means that even with identical electoral and party structures, some local governments do more for their citizens than others. Why do some of these governments fund more education, more health, and more infrastructure projects than others? Since much of economic development hinges on public services, understanding how citizens hold their governments accountable for their provision is central to the task of understanding economic development itself.
This research explores the determinants of political accountability in sub Saharan Africa by examining the incentives of local-level politicians in over 750 districts in six African countries. Development policy over the past two decades has changed radically from a narrow concentration on economic issues to a broad concern with political institutions and accountability. But while practitioners may now believe the importance of accountability to development, we did not have a good understanding of the causes of that accountability.
By using sub national level data, I tease out two important non-institutional types of factors that enhance or impede accountability. First, I explore the effects of social and structural factors -- such as wealth, social capital, and ethnicity -- that explain public service provision. For Africa especially, the effect of ethnicity on government performance has received an enormous amount of attention, but has not been tested systematically. Second, I examine how the fiscal links between citizens and their government helps determine accountability. In my previous work using sub national data from Tanzania and Zambia, I have found strong support for the idea that the source of government revenue affects political accountability: the more local taxes a district government collects from its own constituents, the more public services it provides; the more donor or central government money it collects, the fewer services it supplies. Where politicians get their money affects what they do.
Africa is the poorest continent and currently the object of great attention for its plight. Understanding the causes of political accountability increases the possibility that willing African governments can design their policies so as to increase the public services they provide. For willing and unwilling African countries, this study increases the chances that donors can create aid packages that work better. Bilateral and multilateral donor organizations are creating new policies at this very moment to increase accountability as a condition on continued assistance.
No one has compiled or used complete sets of sub national African data to explore the effects of government revenue, ethnicity, and aid on public service provision. Accurate tests to tease out what causes governments to provide crucial public services are also virtually unknown. My early research has already been discussed by officials at the US Agency for International Development, the UK's Department for International Development, and the World Bank. This project provides students and scholars of development policy with better theoretical approaches and valuable, previously unused data. It also supplies policymakers with tools for designing more effective development policies for the only geographical region in the world where poverty is still increasing.
