This project addresses a central question in political economics, which is how to select public officials. It focuses on two institutions that are used to select and retain judges for the state courts in the U.S. states. Under one institution, the governor selects a new judge when there is an open seat in the bench, and the incumbent judge whose term expires has to face an up-or-down vote by the voters at the end of each term, without challengers. Under the other institution, judges are selected through contested elections which involve competition between political parties, and the incumbent judges run for re-election of the same kind with competition among candidates.
This research focuses on the turnover rate of the judges under the two systems. Statistics show that the failure rate in the re-election is substantially higher for the elected judges than for appointed judges. The central questions are (i) whether the lower failure rate under the appointment and up-or-down vote implies weaker accountability and weaker effect of reelection concern on the behavior of judges, and (ii) what are the main politico-economic factors that affect the judges' reelection probability along with their behavior. These issues are addressed by constructing and estimating a dynamic model of judges' behavior using individual- level data of judges' criminal sentencing and electoral outcomes. Through this analysis, this project answers (i) how the re-election processes differ under the two systems empirically, in the sense of the sensitivity of the reelection outcome to judges' behavior, judge's characteristics, and political and social characteristics of the constituency, and (ii) how the characteristics of the judges selected under the two systems differ. Through this analysis, the project provides precise answers for the interpretation of the turnover rate and the difference of the two systems in terms of accountability.
Intellectual Merit: This research is the first attempt to explain the patterns of electoral outcomes of judicial elections in conjunction with the individual judges' behavior in the court, which is an innovative feature enabled by using individual-level data. Moreover, it is the first attempt to estimate a dynamic model of public officials' policy decisions in conjunction with re-running decisions, and represents a significant contribution to the existing literature.
Broader Significance: How to select public officials has been a controversial issue for many public offices in the U.S. such as public utility commissioners and school boards. There has also been a long debate (e.g., by American Bar Association) regarding functioning of judicial selection mechanisms, and long-lasting debate without clear understanding caused frequent change of the rules. Concrete understanding from this project helps to improve the institutional design for selection of public officials and the institutional stability. The research also provides a good ground for understanding more complex phenomena such as the increasing role of electoral campaign in judicial elections in many states.
