Doctoral Dissertation Research: Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment, 1991 to 2006
SES - 0719274
Project Abstract
An increased reliance on expert bureaucrats in an increasingly complex society combined with the insulation from politics afforded to administrators has created a dilemma in determining the proper role for unelected bureaucrats in a democratic society. Judicial scholars have demonstrated that the independence of the judicial branch enables judges to base decisions largely on their own political preferences. It is possible that the insulation from political involvement that is afforded to federal civil servants similarly enables bureaucrats to insert their own personal political preferences into policy decisions
Using a variety of statistical methods, this study systematically examines one set of bureaucratic experts, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) at the National Labor Relations Board, to determine whether personal political preferences play a role in bureaucratic decision making. Additionally, the study examines the reach of the influence of ALJ preferences by examining the extent to which ALJ decisions are adopted by reviewing bodies when cases are appealed to the agency's Board members and the relevant U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Results help to determine the nature and pervasiveness of political decision making by bureaucrats in American government. Lastly, I examine the extent to which ALJs act strategically in their decision making when considering review by the political appointees of the Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and whether strategic considerations can limit or mask political decision making by ALJs. The results speak to the degree to which judicial controls provide a means of limiting bureaucratic discretion.
These statistical analyses are based on a collection of nearly 6,000 initial decisions issued by over 100 ALJs as well as all subsequent appeals to the Board and Courts of Appeals, since 1991. The project identifies ALJ political party affiliation by contacting state and local boards of elections and searching FEC records. Party affiliation data are gathered primarily at locations surrounding the four Divisions of Judges of the NLRB: Atlanta, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. This project makes exciting new contributions to literature in both bureaucratic and judicial politics. It extends our understanding of the judicial process into the realm of the bureaucracy, an arena we know to be highly legalistic. It also augments our understanding of bureaucratic incentives, by specifically examining political preferences. If the public's desire to have complex decisions made on the basis of expertise is instead met with bureaucrats who rely on their own political preferences to solve problems, this prompts us to reassess our increasing reliance on unelected government officials to make decisions that impact Americans.
