Over the past ten years a trend has emerged among African democracies whereby many presidents have attempted to amend national constitutions for the purpose of abolishing executive term limits. Some presidents have been successful in their bids to lift term limits; some have failed; while still other presidents have willingly stepped down after their two terms in office without attempting such a constitutional change. What causes some leaders to try for a third term while others are content to relinquish power once their constitutionally mandated two terms are up? Going a step further, among cases where the leader has decided to push for a term limit amendment, what accounts for the success or failure of those bids? The aim of this project is to answer these questions and to take the explanations a step further by examining how the plasticity of term limit laws across Africa affects the prospects of democratic consolidation on the continent. Understanding the degree to which leaders are constrained from achieving their personal preferences by formal democratic institutions and how presidents can utilize prior informal institutions, such as patronage networks, to gain advantages within the political system can help answer the important question of how and the degree to which formal democratic institutions are influential in Africa. The first stage of this project investigates how individual leaders make the decision to either step down after two terms in office or try for a third term by sponsoring a constitutional amendment. This is carried out through a choice-centered analysis that builds a theoretical decision calculus that is then tested and verified through interviews with former presidents and their close associates, such as cabinet members and ministry heads. The second stage of the project seeks to uncover the reasons why, after a decision is made to seek a third term, some presidents succeed in getting an amendment passed while others fail. In this stage, both regression analysis and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) are used to uncover the relevant variables across cases in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by in-country case studies of three nations, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia, in order to identify the causal mechanisms that underlie term limit extension bid outcomes. Data for each case study will be gathered through semi-structured personal interviews, focus group interviews, institutional analysis, archival research, and public opinion data analysis. A broader impact of this study is providing policymakers with the means for understanding when and how presidents can overcome legally set limits to their power, which is crucial in Africa, as well as other regions, because of the painful history of ?big man? rule across the continent. The brutal past regimes of dictators such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), and Charles Taylor in Liberia are all too vivid in the memories of many Africans. Uncovering the conditions (both political and social) that allow leaders to flaunt limits to their power is a first step in fostering the conditions in which democracy can survive in these nations.
