For the past decade, much research in international relations has studied the effects of domestic political institutions upon foreign policy decisions and outcomes. One particularly fruitful line of research has focused on the domestic political incentives of leaders and how these differ between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Scholars, however, have paid surprisingly little attention to the remarkable variation among non-democracies in both their domestic institutional structures and their foreign policy behaviors. The question of why some non-democracies pursue belligerent foreign policies, while others maintain peaceful and cooperative relations with the international community remains a woefully under-researched question in the political science literature.
This dissertation sheds light on the domestic politics of foreign policy in non-democratic states and challenges the conventional wisdom about the relationship between regime type and conflict, questioning the assumption that democratic institutions are the primary way that leaders can be held accountable by domestic groups. It does so by focusing on differences in leader accountability in non-democratic regimes and how the possibility of domestic punishment affects the foreign policy calculations of leaders of non-democratic nations. It draws on recent work on non-democracies from comparative politics that highlights the importance of politics within the ruling elite and develops a rigorous theory of accountability that generates falsifiable hypotheses about variation in foreign policies, including war participation, war-winning, punishment after war, and the ability of leaders to communicate credibly in international politics. The project uses both case study and quantitative analysis of domestic political characteristics to test these hypotheses. The Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant would fund research assistants to help in the construction of a dataset of autocratic regime characteristics.
Broader Implications. The dissertation promises to generate insights of interest to policy-makers dealing with non-democracies in foreign relations. Explaining how domestic politics affect the incentives of leaders not subject to elections and parliaments is crucial for policymakers who seek ways to forge lasting international agreements, interpret threats and promises, and cooperate with non-democratic states such as Iran, North Korea, and China.
