Nearly half of the American states spend millions of dollars on some form of public election financing. In state legislative elections, there is a growing tendency for states to directly subsidize candidates who agree to abide by pre-set spending limits. Despite the growing ubiquity of large subsidies and well-defined spending limits, political scientists have not fully considered the impact of these systems on campaign dynamics. Much previous analysis of public funding has assumed that the infusion of money holds the potential to create more competitive elections, but little has been discovered regarding the causal chain between subsidy and competition.
This project focuses on the relationship between public money and how candidates spend their time engaging voters, and on whether altered campaign dynamics translate to changes in voter behavior. Using survey and interview data from candidates in twelve states, a theory of voter mobilization in publicly funded elections is developed and tested. The theory posits that publicly-funded candidates spend more time engaging voters. At the same time, it predicts that interest groups unable to influence elections monetarily will directly support mobilization efforts. In short, voters in publicly-funded elections are more likely to be mobilized, leading to higher levels of efficacy, knowledge, and participation.
Survey data will be supplemented with election returns, turnout statistics, and campaign finance disclosures. Various statistical models will be used to analyze the effect public money has upon candidate entry, time allocations, and voter mobilization. Quantitative findings will be supported with qualitative candidate interviews.
This research will advance political scientists? understanding of the manner in which public election financing changes campaign dynamics. First, the analysis transcends election statistics, incorporating the strategic and emotional concerns of candidates. Second, the project considers the affects of this altered strategic environment on political elites, groups, and the electorate at large. Suggesting that public election financing changes strategy and emotion system-wide, the theory broadens the criteria with which public financing will be evaluated. The project also extends current research methodologically, employing a mixed methods approach focused on political actors in publicly-funded systems.
Finally, this research supports the broader academic and policy communities. Several states are seriously considering the implementation of public funding for future elections. Understanding the manner in which public financing changes election strategy and voter mobilization is of paramount importance as these deliberations continue. The project will provide the most complete picture to date of how political actors and voters respond to the availability of public election subsidies.
