This project examines the role of the federal bureaucracy as the "antennae" of government. The bureaucracy compensates for the attention limits of the elected branches of government in sending them signals about important policy problems. The research addresses two primary questions:
1. What effect does bureaucratic signaling about policy problems have on the policy agendas of Congress and the President? 2. How does attention and authoritative political decisions affect the content and dynamics of signaling by the federal bureaucracy?
A theory of bureaucratic influence is developed that relates scarcity of attention and institutional organization to the content and dynamics of policy agendas. Using time series techniques, the substance and volatility of policy agendas in and between the federal bureaucracy and elected branches of government are examined. The theorizing in this project developed a new framework and a unique set of research questions that pave the way for new avenues of inquiry that moves beyond the state of current theorizing on the role of bureaucracy in democratic governance. The research design generates a unique set of data related to agenda setting in federal agencies since the Second World War. These data sets will benefit scholars studying bureaucracies as well as those working in related subfields such as presidential administration and congressional policymaking.
