This dissertation research analyzes the role of Russian business elites in developing the legal framework for a market economy. In recent years a near consensus has emerged among social scientists, legal scholars, and policymakers that secure property rights are essential for economic growth. Debate continues as to how institutions that protect property rights emerge, but many scholars argue that the existence of powerful societal actors with a stake in an effective legal framework is a key determinant of institutional development. Yet if secure property rights are vital for economic prosperity, why is the demand for the rule of law so weak in many societies?

The project builds on the argument that business elites' support for legal development depends on their strategies for protecting and acquiring assets. Specifically, it examines the link between these strategies and two related elements of societal demand for institutional development: (1) The extent to which business groups lobby for market-supporting laws, such as legislation for investor protection and effective arbitration procedural codes; and (2) The degree to which private sector actors rely on the legal system.

To address these issues, the project includes an original survey of Russian firm owners and managers. This survey complements the other components of the project, including qualitative fieldwork and formal modeling. The qualitative component consists of case studies of Russian legal reforms, semi-structured interviews with Russian business and political elites, and content analysis of business association and government documents. This qualitative research informs the assumptions and structure of the formal model, which analyzes the micro-level logic underlying firms' decisions to support or oppose reforms.

The project's findings will contribute to social scientists' and legal scholars' understanding of the politics of building legal institutions, offering insights into which actors are most likely to support legal reforms and which reforms are most likely to succeed. They will thereby contribute to policy debates about secure property rights, an issue that is of central interest to U.S. experts promoting growth in developing countries and to Russian policymakers seeking to diversify their economy.

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Social and Economic Sciences (SES)
Type
Standard Grant (Standard)
Application #
0921635
Program Officer
Christian A. Meissner
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
2009-09-01
Budget End
2010-08-31
Support Year
Fiscal Year
2009
Total Cost
$12,000
Indirect Cost
Name
University of California Berkeley
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
Berkeley
State
CA
Country
United States
Zip Code
94704