Scholars, lawmakers, and the general public have little understanding as to why some laws last a long period of time without the substantial amendment while others are either killed or substantially amended in a relative short period of time. What accounts for this difference? Are there certain tactics that Congress uses that increase the likelihood that a law will continue in its original form, unchanged by future Congresses? Are there conditions at the time of enactment that affect whether a law will live a long life? And what effect do subsequent conditions have? Do they influence the likelihood that a law will be amended in a significant way? In this project we build on and extend our earlier work (Maltzman and Shipan 2006; forthcoming) to examine why some laws are amended soon after passage while others remain untouched by future Congresses.
The importance of understanding how a law can be designed to have a long lasting impact cannot be overstated. First, the longer a law lasts before it is amended, the greater the potential to shape the nation's economic, social, and political welfare. Second, much of the value of legislation--to legislators, to interest groups, to the general public, and so on--comes from the assumption that the law itself will have longevity. When this original agreement is revised through future amendments, such changes affect the value of that law to the original participants. Third, compliance with the law depends in large part upon a calculation regarding its longevity. If one believes a law is likely to be either rescinded or revised, rational actors will abstain from investing in compliance. Finally, we live in a period when the general public, pundits, and even lawmakers recognize that Congress's capacity to address all of society's problems is limited. Part of this limit reflects two issues that are beyond the scope of our project--the extent of the nation's problems and normative issues regarding the proper role of government. At the same time, however, this limit may reflect the fact that our lawmaking institutions repeatedly are called upon to address issues that had been confronted earlier, by previous Congresses. Our project has the potential to limit the need for consistently revisiting the issues that confront the nation.
Once laws are passed in the United States, some last for years without being amended. Others, however, are changed soon after their passage. Our goal in this project is to understand why some laws are more durable than others. To investigate this, we examine whether laws last longer when they are passed under unified government; when they are passed by bipartisan agreements; when they are less divisive initially; when they are less complex; and so on. We find that laws last longer when they are passed under unified government and when the two chambers of Congress are ideologically similar; and when the laws themselves are less divisive and less complex. We also investigate why Congress chooses to structure laws in certain ways. Why, for example, does it sometimes include "sunset provisions" in laws (which can force Congress to revisit a law after a specified period of time)? And when Congress does revisit laws and amends them, what is the nature of these amendments? Are they supported by the law's original supporters, or by those who opposed the original law? This provides insight into whether the amendment strengthens or weakens the law. We also investigate what causes the courts to hear some laws soon after passage, while taking much longer to assess other laws. We find that laws are more likely to be brought into the courts when they are passed under divided government, and when they are both divisive and complex. Interestingly, we also examine whether the inclusion of severability clauses -- which, some would argue, make it easier for the courts to hear a law, since if they find a part of the law that they don't like, they can separate this part (i.e., sever it, and not have to strike down the whole law) -- affects the length of time it takes for a law to reach the courts. We find that it does not. Overall, then, our project has the potential to inform public debates about the conditions under which laws are more likely to be long-lasting. Currently there is a lot of anecdotal information about such conditions (e.g., the effect of divided government, bipartisanship, sunset provisions, etc.); but ours is the first to systematically speak to these issues, and as such can deeply inform our understanding of various normative aspects of public policy.
