During what Samuel Huntington called the Third Wave of Democratization, nearly 100 countries began the process of democratization. These countries set up democratic institutions, began holding elections, and many liberalized restrictions on the media and on civil and political rights. Although the democratization efforts of many Eastern European countries have generally been successful, many countries in Africa and the Middle East have belied expectations. In fact, just 20% of countries democratizing under the third wave successfully transitioned. As a result, there exists a wide range of countries that are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian. Moreover, these semi-democratic (or semi-authoritarian) countries hold regular elections at the national and local levels in which opposition groups participate and win some seats in the national legislature.
The failed transitions of the third wave have produced an interesting phenomenon: authoritarian elections. We do not fully understand whether and how these elections are important and the role of elections in democratic transitions. Do authoritarian elections create opportunities for further democratization or do they simply sustain authoritarian governments? In order to clarify the role of elections in authoritarian regimes, this project examines the causes and consequences of election boycotts, and the subsequent regime response. Determining the conditions under which governments respond to the demands of boycotting opposition parties will allow us to identify those elections that further democratization and establish the criteria that distinguish them from those elections that impede it.
Although boycotts occur with increasing frequency, the literature has yet to sufficiently explain the following two questions: (1) Why do political parties decide to boycott an election? and (2) When and why are boycotts a successful strategy? This project argues that in order to answer these questions and better explain election boycotts, we need to account for the institutions under which elections operate (the electoral rules) and the existence of factionalism within opposition political parties. In this project, a theory of election boycotts is developed using a game theoretic model. The model is used to develop a causal account for the relationship between electoral rules and election boycotts and between intraparty factionalism and election boycotts. The propositions derived from the model are then tested using both qualitative and quantitative tools. The model was informed from research conducted in Jordan in 2009 and three months of field research will be undertaken in Algeria to evaluate the propositions derived from the model. The propositions will also be tested using a dataset consisting of over 700 national-level elections in both democratic and authoritarian regimes from 1990-2006.
Given the vast number of countries across Africa, Asia and the Middle East that are now holding elections, but have stalled in their democratization efforts, the present study represents a timely addition to the literature. The project has broader implications for both the historical understanding of Jordan and Algeria, and also for our understanding of democratic transitions. The broader impact is thus twofold. First, the information and data collected during fieldwork in Jordan and Algeria will increase our understanding of the recent electoral histories of both countries, and explain and clarify how the opposition?s recent pattern of participation and non-participation has affected the democratic transition in both states. Second, in determining the consequences of opposition party behavior this project will have more general conclusions about the process of democratic transition. This study, therefore, is important not only for enhancing our understanding of Algeria and Jordan, but also through an extensive study of these countries, the literature will gain an improved understanding of the role elections play in democratic transitions.
Authoritarian elections present a dilemma for opposition political parties. Should the opposition participate in elections that are largely unfair? Should the opposition boycott the elections or resort to extra-electoral means? The goal of this dissertation project was to further our understanding of the opposition’s strategic choices in authoritarian elections. Previous research on election boycotts has not accounted for a common pattern of participation and boycott observed in authoritarian elections. The Islamic Action Front in Jordan, for example, boycotted the legislative elections in 1997 and 2010 protesting the election law but participated in 1993, 2003 and 2007 under this same election law. Opposition groups rarely boycott every election and their selective participation suggests that the opposition values participation, at least under certain conditions. One of the main contributions of this project is its provision of an explanation for why rational actors would participate in authoritarian elections and why these same actors would also boycott. My project diverges from previous work on election boycotts in its explicit and systematic focus on legitimacy. I examine how beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime affect the strategies adopted by the opposition and the regime’s response. An important result of the theoretical model is that electoral prospects do not affect the oppositions’ decisions to boycott, participate or trigger a crisis in authoritarian regimes. Electoral prospects will, however, influence strategic decisions under democratic regimes. This finding contradicts previous theories and explanations of elections boycotts for which poor electoral prospects are a central determinant of the decision to participate or boycott. Such poor prospects might result from the conditions under which the election is held (e.g. fraud), the institutions governing the elections (e.g. the electoral system), or the type of election (presidential or parliamentary). I find that it is not, in fact, electoral prospects driving the opposition to boycott or participate. Rather, I find the opposition’s beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime to be the primary determinant of their strategic decisions. The fieldwork undertaken for the case studies of Jordan and Algeria allowed me to examine how the opposition’s shifting perceptions of regime legitimacy drove changes in the strategies adopted across elections. In addition to providing an explanation for opposition behavior during Algerian elections between 1999 and 2007, the archival work conducted under this grant contextualized the decisions of political actors by outlining the socio-economic and political conditions under which the parties made their strategic decisions. Thus, the archival work not only allowed me to further evaluate the predictions derived from the model but it also allowed me to make a broader contribution beyond legitimacy and opposition politics. Political science has devoted relatively less attention to Algeria than other Middle East and North African countries holding elections such as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco. Since the return of multiparty politics in Algeria in 1997, there have been few analytic studies of this specific aspect of Algerian political history (i.e. of elections and political parties over this time period). Thus, in addition to its provision of an explanation for opposition behavior during elections between 1999 and 2007, this chapter adds to our knowledge of the socio-economic and political context against which the four elections took place, and importantly, the opposition made its strategic decisions.
