PI: Pamela S. Tolbert Co-PI: Lena Hipp Institution: Cornell University
This research examines the effects of labor market policies on employees' perceptions of job security. If employees believe that their jobs are endangered (even if they actually are not), they are less committed to their organizations, may look for alternative job opportunities. National governments and organizations thus have an interest in understanding the forces that affect employees? perceptions of their job security and employment prospects. By distinguishing between policies that focus on reducing employees' vulnerability (unemployment benefits) and policies that focus on reducing power differentials between the employee and the employer (dismissal protection), the effectiveness of different types of labor market institutions will be tested.
Broader Impacts: The findings of this research can be used to inform the development of public policies and organizational measures to reduce job insecurity and its negative consequences.
By examining the impact of labor market policies on employees’ perceptions of job security, this dissertation seeks to understand the mechanisms through which formal institutions generate confidence and positive expectations among individuals regarding their economic future. Does dismissal protection give employees confidence in the continuity of their jobs? Do unemployment benefits increase employees’ confidence of finding a new job and reduce their worries about job loss? How does the presence of temporary employees affect workers' perceived job security? Through the combination of large-scale survey data and in-depth interviews with employees, this research shows that perceptions are not always congruent with economic and institutional facts. Organizational characteristics and individual differences seem to be more relevant than national-level policies to how workers feel about their jobs. Another important finding of this research is that the effects of policies vary depending on their design. Formal institutions that reduce vulnerability by providing assurance (unemployment benefits) and by establishing a comparison group with lower levels of protection (temporary workers) seem to be more effective in instilling confidence and positive expectations than those that increase the costs for unilateral breach of contract (dismissal protection). These findings are of theoretical importance in challenging the implicit rationality assumption that formal institutions always achieve their intended outcomes, an assumption which underlies the bulk of comparative research on welfare states and national production systems. They are also of practical relevance, as they can help to inform the development of labor market policies and organizational measures intended to increase workers’ sense of job security
