Nearly one-third of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have restructured their governments and increased the number of administrative units in the past two decades. When unaccompanied by changes in the distribution of power, this process is known as deconcentration, and is defined as the spatial decomposition of the state apparatus, and the multiplication of administrative units at lower tiers of government. To understand these recent changes, this project proposes an in-depth study of the Kenyan state. Within Kenya, the beginning of deconcentration in 1992 coincided with the country's first multi-party elections since the independence era. The sudden and massive multiplication of administrative units in Kenya during this time period did not follow historical trends, levels of development, or stated administrative concerns such as security issues or population growth. Moreover, it did not begin as a concerted effort to extend authority. In understanding this increase in the state apparatus, the driving intuition for this project is that the power to shape the structure and size of this body often lies unchecked under a country's executive. In this new electoral environment, Kenyan presidents have overseen unit creation and shaped the state in response to their electoral needs.
This project traces when and where new administrative units were created to empirically test several hypotheses. This project amasses and aggregates bi-annual administrative officer returns, which contain the names of administrative areas, as well as redistricting maps since 1990. Collected at this frequency, these data allow for the delineation of any changes in the country's internal units, and will be used to understand the dynamics that affect when and where a state extends its authority.
The intellectual merit of this project lies in its promise to advance the literature of state building. Most work in this sub-field examines the development and effect of post-independence era institutions. This work focuses on recent reorganizations to understand how state building progresses as a response to changes in the institutional environment.
This project will make several broader contributions. This work will be of use to journalists, policy makers, and civil society organizations. Additionally, a better understanding of the logic of state structure promises to contribute to the ongoing debates within policy and international organization circles regarding decentralization and devolution of power.
Since the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War, multi-party democracy has increased throughout sub-Saharan Africa,and the largest threat to executives is now largely electoral. This research project asks -- under this new institutional environment, how have executives re-shaped the state institutions under their control to handle these new electoral threats? How have executives used the state to further their political ambitions including managing other elite politicians? This project attempts to answer these questions by looking at Kenya. Since the beginning of multi-party elections in 1992, the number of administrative districts has skyrocketed fro 41 to 286 today without clear . The Provincial Administration (PA) -- Kenya's internal security apparatus -- has more than doubled in size. Moreover Kenya recently adopted a new constituton that devolved power to newly-created counties. To answer these questions, I used the NSF DDIG award to undertake 11 months of field reserach in Kenya. I collected administrative records on Kenya's state structure and administrative apparatus from 1990-2011, archival material detailing elite decisions about changing Kenya's state structure, and more than 75 elite interviews. I broadly argue that the state is regime-speci?c. Leaders with strong executive control over the state shape it to meet pressing short-term needs. Before weighing the long-run effects of a reform, a leader needs to be secure in his short-run political tenure; he evaluates the predominant threats to his rule and the capabilities of different state institutions as he shapes the state to best maintain political power. Within the Kenyan case, I find that recent changes to the state have been promoted by incumbent presidents in an attempt to win re-election. They have used the state both to entice and to coerce. Kenya's electoral rules stipulate that a president must win 25% of the vote in five of Kenya's eight provinces. While Moi's support was consolidated or opposed in some provinces, a few were considered toss-ups, or swing provinces. Regarding district creation, President Moi (1978-2002) created new districts for minority ethnic groups in swing provinces. New units -- which the local population sees as a patronage gift because of the increased infrastructure, job creation, and central government funds -- helped endear the population to him. New units also empowered the area's new local elites to broker votes for him in the run-up to an election (see Figure 1). In addition, Moi changed the PA to better deliver votes. First, he increased the size of the PA in these new units and in the run-up to elections to engage in coercive activities -- from low-level actions such as denying opposition candidates nomination papers to high-level actions such as fomenting pre-election violnce (see Figures 2 and 3). To further ensure that officers succeeded in these coercive activities, he strategically assigned loyal high-level PA officers to govern co-ethnics, ensuring that they understood local dynamics. The analysis for President Kibaki (2002 - 2013) is preliminary but shows many of the same trends.
