Bicameral legislatures tend to promote policy stability, can represent two distinct characterizations of the populace, and can ameliorate the shortcomings of majoritarianism. However, many studies of policy making in democratic regimes ignore the existence of a second chamber, either to simplify the modeling task or to minimize data collection. Both formal theoretical and empirical literatures have made clear that carefully accounting for the existence of a second chamber can dramatically alter expectations about how policy outcomes are achieved. This project will advance theorizing on the strategic dynamics of bicameralism and collect data to systematically test the observable implications derived from that theorizing.
The intellectual merit of this project is connected to its combination of formal modeling and empirical analysis to better understand the effects of bicameralism. Scholars have defined two features for characterizing the variation in bicameral systems. One key element is whether both chambers have equal constitutional powers (symmetry) or if the upper chamber is subordinated to the lower chamber (asymmetry). Another key element is how the upper chamber is elected relative to the lower chamber. This design component will determine whether the preferences of members are likely to be congruent or incongruent. Recent scholarship has suggested that where one chamber lacks proposal power (an example of asymmetry), the majority in that chamber has an incentive to delegate gatekeeping power to an unrepresentative agent, heightening incongruence. We extend this thinking to deduce observable implications for legislative committee systems. The project will develop formal theoretical models of interbranch and intrabranch relations based on proposal rights and agenda-setting power with implications for legislative institutions and policy stability. Testing these models requires the collection of data on the relative powers of chambers (symmetry/asymmetry) and the distribution of preferences across pivotal players (congruence/incongruence). Like the U.S., the democratic regimes of Latin America are presidential systems and half of the countries in the region have bicameral legislatures; they are the focus of data collection efforts.
The broader impacts of the project are related to the importance of institutional design for policy-making and democratization. Better understanding institutions and their effects is important to establishing stable democratic institutions. The project will make available data on upper chambers, allowing scholars and practitioners to evaluate how institutional design affects outcomes.
