This research is part of an ongoing investigation of the actions and interactions of nations in disputes that reach the crisis level, that is when the threat of war is present. The purpose of the investigation is to develop a better understanding of what types of actions, or bargaining strategies, are associated with the outbreak of war and what types are most effective in resolving crises without resort to war. The study also investigates what effects previous crisis experiences are likely to have on the bargaining strategies chosen by statesmen when they find their states engaged in successive crises with the same adversary. This section focuses particularly on the Middle East and U.S. - Soviet Crises. The researcher employs a random sample of forty crises occurring between 1816 to 1980. For each of these crises, diplomatic histories and press accounts have been used to construct verbal chronologies of the actions of the participants. The verbal chronologies, in turn, have been converted into machine readable descriptions that may be analyzed. This facilitates classifying the crises according to distinct behavioral types, which are based on the patterns of conflict escalation-deescalation and reciprocity shown in the actions of the participants. Then it becomes possible to consider which behavioral types are most, or least, war-prone, and what conditions are most likely to produce those types. It is also possible to analyze the actions and reactions of states as they use different bargaining strategies in their attempts to influence the other side in the course of the crisis. This facilitates the search for answers to questions regarding which bargaining strategies are most often associated with war outcomes, and which are most likely to allow statesmen to avoid war without having to pay the price of submission to the other side. The research completed to date suggests that statesmen tend to adopt a realpolitik approach to crisis bargaining that prescribes the use of coercive tactics and a strong demonstration of resolve. There is also evidence that, particularly among states that are evenly matched in power, the use of escalating coercive tactics is associated with war outcomes. In addition, there is some indication that realpolitik reasoning is applied to the "lessons" that statesmen draw from previous crisis experiences and that this tends to make each successive crisis more dangerous. Preliminary findings also suggest that a "reciprocating" strategy combining tit-for-tat responses with offers to cooperate may be the most effective overall crisis bargaining strategy. The investigation will take a more thorough and rigorous look at the validity of these preliminary findings as well as a range of other questions associated with the behavior of states in crises.
