Numerous researchers have sought to reformulate in game-theoretic terms the explicit rationalism of the Realist view of balance of power politics in international affairs. However, they fail to consider two important features of the balance of power politics: first, the games which nations play are sequential, and second, the outcomes of initial plays can affect profoundly the strategic character of subsequent games. This research will offer a model of balance of power politics which corresponds to the Realist view of international affairs - - specifically, of nation states which bargain to secure advantage in the overall distribution of some fixed supply of resources. This bargaining may, of course, lead to the eventual elimination of countries, but systems in which the investigators predict, on the basis of a version of the bargaining set appropriate to this scenario, that no country will be eliminated are termed "system-stable." In this game theoretic modeling exercise the investigator seeks to include war costs into the model and to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for an international system to be system stable. The research also seeks a generalization of the analysis in which assumptions about costs are more general. Finally, the investigator will complete the acquisition of data relating to coalitions and conflicts during the Warring States period of China, and the development of appropriate indirect measures of resource capabilities for an analysis of the coalitional structures observed over time.
