Recent experiences in France with "cohabitation" and minority Government demonstrate that the rules of parliamentary procedure shape the behavior of parliamentary actors and consequently play a central role in determining policy outcomes. These experiences also show that electoral outcomes determine opportunities for parliamentary actors to utilize parliamentary rules. Hence, if we are to understand how French parilamentary institutions promote - - or inhibit - - the political representation of French citizens, it is essential that we clearly understand how parliamentary institutions in France shape behavior by parliamentary actors. This doctoral dissertation research project examines theoretically and empirically parliamentary decision making rules, political influence, and legislative outcomes in the French National Assembly. The research attempts to describe and explain how election outcomes shape opportunities for parliamentary actors to utilize parliamentary rules in ways that influence final policy. The study focuses on the use of parliamentary procedures by four actors: the President, the Government (i.e., the prime minister and cabinet), committees, and private members on the floor. As a theoretical framework, the study relies heavily on formal, deductive models of legislative choice. The plan of research includes two tasks to be accomplished in Paris, France. First, the relationship between procedural rules and legislative outcomes will be assessed by constructing a data set that codes various procedures invoked in connection with bills submitted to the National Assembly during four different periods in the last twelve years. Items that will be coded include motions to delay, motions to censure, blocked votes, referrals to the Constitutional Council, gatekeeping by committees, gatekeeping through agenda control by the Government, declarations of non-germaneness of amendments, presidential "vetoes" of decrees, conference committees with the Senate, and the Government status. Second, interviews will be conducted with the Assembly's parliamentarian, the permanent secretaries of several committees, and deputies from several parties in order to learn how these actors perceive the relationship between decision rules and legislative influence during the periods of interest. This study will contribute significantly to our understanding of how French parliamentary institutions and election outcomes shape opportunities for parliamentary actors to influence policy. The study will also illuminate the assumptions that must be made to model legislative institutions that are unique to parliamentary systems, making possible a more general theory of legislative choice in democratic systems.
