From the New Deal through the 1970s, levels of party voting and of party loyalty had declined among members of the House of Representatives. Since the 1970s, however, there has been a sharp resurgence of partisanship, and previous explanations do not anticipate or account for this recent change. The objective of this research is to develop a theory of party voting which explains both partisan decline and resurgence, and to determine whether the theory's predictions are consistent with available evidence on politics in the House. The development of the theory begins with a focus on the factors that influence the choice of a single member on a single vote. It builds from there to a consideration of the way choices of individuals eventually are combined into the aggregate of all votes on all issues within an entire Congress. The relevant factors include influences on members' preferences, institutional processes that shape alternatives for choice, and outside or inside forces that vary the mix of issues over time. Based on this analysis, it is argued that the variations in partisan voting depend on changes in electoral influences (particularly realignment of voters at the district level and changes in the kinds of candidates recruited by the two parties), on changes in the agenda of issues considered by the House, and on alterations of the institutional arrangements that govern how bills are shaped and how they are considered on the House floor. In marshalling data to determine whether the theoretical arguments are supported, the study of electoral influences will include analysis over time of changes in the issue preferences of voters for House candidates of the two parties, and collection of information on the political positions of candidates competing for House nominations within each party over the last 36 years. The consideration of the changing issue agenda will include analysis of all roll calls on the House floor from 1953 through 1988, focusing on the degree to which voting patterns remain consistent within issue categories. Finally, the analysis of institutional arrangements will trace the impact of decreases in the power of committee chairmen and the adoption of new rules to strengthen party leaders on the kinds of alternatives members are faced with on the floor. This segment of the study also considers the influence of particular party leaders and particular presidents on the kinds of choices members confronted. If the theory of congressional partisanship is supported by the evidence, it will require a significant revision in the current conceptions of political conflict in the House, which regard political parties to be weak and member ties to them of little importance. The analysis will also show how greater partisanship can be exhibited by elected representatives even when traditional ties between parties and voters are growing progressively weaker. Finally, the theory will enable a specification of the conditions which are likely to lead to greater or lesser partisanship in political institutions in the future.
