This highly theoretical research develops a formal, mathematical model of the interaction between voters and legislators in a unicameral legislative system. Most existing formal models of the relationship of voters and legislators deal with a fixed time period and treat the relationship as one directional. Voters are assumed to influence legislative behavior or vice versa but not both. However, because elections and the legislative process are inherently dynamic processes where influence flows both ways simultaneously, existing models are limited in the questions they can address. This research models the representative process as one of reciprocal influence where decisions by voters influence decisions by legislators which then influence decisions by voters in the next period. The process continues indefinitely until equilibrium is achieved. This means that voters, when they make their decisions, anticipate the reactions of legislators. Legislators, in turn, anticipate the reaction of voters when deciding policies. The project will proceed to use these models to explain the development of certain common institutional features of legislatures including political parties, seniority, safe seats and lobbying. When completed this project will greatly strengthen existing theories of representative relationships, enhance their realism, and provide a more systematic and rigorous basis for evaluating the potential effects of proposed legislative reforms such as legislative terms limits.
