Resource dilemmas are created when group members shared limited resources to which all have free access(e.g., groundwater, energy, minerals, endangered species.) When group members request their share from the resource pool independently, with no communication among them, there is experimental evidence showing that as the uncertainty about the size of the resource increases, people increase their requests thereby lowering the probability that their request will be granted. Six experiments are proposed to study the effects of several variables (e.g., amount of uncertainty about the resource, group size, real-time updating of information about total group request) about the resolution of resource dilemmas under two protocols of play. Under one protocol, requests are made simultaneously, and under the other, sequentially with full information about previous requests. The proposed experiments are driven by a game theoretical model prescribing an equilibrium solution and by a decision theoretical model. The findings should be useful in understanding the effects of alternative mechanisms on decision behavior in resource dilemmas, which are among the most serious problems facing modern society.
