There are large reliable differences in probability judgments made by individuals in Western countries like the United States and those in numerous Asian countries. Most differences pertain to calibration. (Good calibration exists, for example, if about 40% of the events that are assigned probability judgements of 40% actually happen.) However, differences in discrimination have been documented too. (Discrimination is the ability of judgements to sharply distinguish instances when a target event will occur from those when it will not.) Several potential explanations of the observed differences are to be tested in experiments with subject groups in the United States and a number of Asian locations. One hypothesis is that the effects are limited to judges' directly reported assessments, which are not their opinions. Another claims that the differences are restricted to a narrow class of events. A third explanation says that they reflect societal differences in the relative importance of various aspects of judgment quality. The hypothesis of primary interest asserts that the effects rest on cognitive processing habits rooted in different educational practices. The proposed studies promise insights about universal judgment mechanisms as well as mechanisms peculiar to given cultures. They should provide guidance about problems in cross- national communication and cooperation and the transferability of decision technologies.
