This project focuses on the way that the legal and institutional structure of government in Japan shapes policymaking and enforcement. The analytic approach is guided by a rational-choice principal-agent perspective. Undertaking both theoretical and empirical work, the research challenges "culturalist" theories holding that Japanese bureaucracy, and more specifically Japanese bureaucratic culture, has a singular and salient effect on Japanese policy-making. A working hypothesis in the study is that "culture" is a less effective explanatory variable than particular rational concerns explored under the rubric of "principal-agent" theory. Based on time-series analyses over four decades, the study examines the impact that changes in international trade and domestic elections have had on budget patterns, regulatory policies, court decisions, and bureaucratic and judicial career paths. By clarifying the institutional structure of politics and testing the impact that this structure has on Japanese domestic and international policies, the study will identify the determinants of Japanese policymaking and enforcement and how those change under foreign pressure. It will also move principal-agent theory beyond its U.S.-based roots to a more global model. As such, it will uncover new ways of understanding the role of party leaders, new forms of principal-agent monitoring, and new implications that such monitoring poses for judicial independence.
