This project is an investigation into the timing of federal government prime contract awards, and has two main thrusts. First, it attempts to refine knowledge of carefully timed economic expansions; scholars over the last decade have suggested that governments may attempt to stimulate the economy in an attempt to bolster the election prospects of incumbents (the Political Business Cycle). Despite the plausibility of such cycles, attempts to find consistent patterns have failed, largely because so few macroeconomic policies are easily controlled by incumbents; as such, it is very difficult for them to orchestrate economic expansions to coincide with elections. Prime contract awards, however, are easily timed, and they also have immediate economic effects. A plausible hypothesis that will be evaluated in this project, then, is that contract awards will increase before elections. Second, the literature on Congressional-bureaucratic relations is clear on the importance of executive branch officials maintaining good relations with members of Congress, particularly those who have influence over agency budgets. Carefully timed contract awards are likely to be seen as an excellent way to maintain goodwill on the Hill, particularly since contract timing strategies are legal, and easily implemented. Past work on government grant programs has suggested that agencies time grant awards to coincide with elections in the districts of influential legislators, this project will extend that work to include prime contract awards which invlove hundreds of billions of dollars annualy. The project will use monthly data on contract awards for the twelve federal agencies most active in procurement activity, with accurate data on the location of the recipient individuals of firms; these data have rarely been subjected to rigorous analysis. For nearly twety years, scholars have been lamenting the lack of such accurate data. The objective is to determine whether contracts are in fact timed to coincide with elections, and to identify who benefits from the practice. The project will show more clearly patterns not only of the distribution of prime contracts, but also patterns of timing. The results will extend our understanding of the Political-Business Cycle phenomenon, as well as theories of congressional-agency relations.
