This project involves parallel theoretical and empirical investigations into the behavior of two sided matching markets, and related markets. It focuses on the phenomenon of "jumping the gun," in which market transactions come earlier and earlier, in response to competition, and resulting in various types of market failure. Preliminary indications are that this may be a much more common form of market failure than is generally recognized. The empirical part of the investigation will focus on a number of other markets which appear to have experienced this phenomenon. In this regard, some of the markets which present promising targets for this investigation are labor markets in medicine (for specialty positions), law (for associate positions in law partnerships and clerkships in Federal courts in the U.S., and for "articling positions" in Canada), dentistry (particularly oral surgery), clinical psychology (pre-doctoral internships), the entry level market for new graduates of elite Japanese universities, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Preliminary indications are that most if not all of these markets have at some point in their histories experienced similar market failures, and have in many cases adopted specific institutional arrangements to deal with these failures. One focus of the investigation will be to examine these market failures and the institutional arrangements developed in response. Another focus will be the degree and manner in which participants in these markets engage in strategic behavior adapted to particular institutional arrangements. These issues also raise new theoretical problems, which will be pursued.
