This project examines a class of social dilemmas in which groups of players are asked to share a resource pool whose size is not known. Rather, the size is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each member of the group requests a share of the resource; individual requests are granted only if the total group request does not exceed x. Experimental evidence shows that as the uncertainty about the resource size increases, people increase their requests thereby increasing the probability that their requests will be denied. Six experiments will be conducted to study several variables of interest in such situations including the amount of uncertainty about the resource, the number of iterations (possible requests from one individual), the value of public and secret information, and speed of feedback concerning individual requests. Several situation protocols will be considered. Under one protocol requests are made independently and simultaneously, under a second protocol requests are made sequentially, and under third protocol only chronological information is provided. The experiments are driven by game theoretical models describing equilibrium solutions and psychological models involving the concept of focal points. This award is to be supplemented under the Research Experiences for Undergraduates (REU) Program. This project provides a variety of excellent research opportunities for for undergraduate students. There are several components of the research where undergraduates have an opportunity to contribute to the project and to work closely with the principal investigator. Specifically, two undergraduate students will be supported. These students will be involved in design, conduct, and analysis of a series of experiments. The integration of students into all phases of the project should be of significant benefit to the students as they plan career goals.
