Scholfield Forty years of theoretical research has produced a generally accepted basic model of two-party electoral competition. This basic model is fundamentally premised on the overriding objective that parties wish to win the election. Given that the formal structure of the model is understood, it is possible to examine variants of the model through incorporating more sophisticated behavior on the part of the electorate, or varying degrees of competence on the part of candidate. Most theories of pre- election behavior in competitive elections have focussed on "policy-blind" models where parties compete to maximize votes or to maximize the expected number of seats. Other models focus on "coalition risk" that assume parties care about policy and form specific coalitions based on policy agreements. The proposed research builds on the investigators previous work on an equilibrium model of multiparty competition which incorporates the beliefs of political parties concerning both electoral risk and coalition risk. This work will refine the general electoral risk-coalition risk model. Two major questions will be examined: (1) Do parties simply maximize the expected number of seats or do their preferences incorporate variances in the electoral response? and (2) Does the incorporation of policy concerns provide a superior explanation of party declarations? It is envisioned that this research, through using computer simulation and econometric analysis in combination, will not only advance understanding of democratic theory but also provide a strong methodological tool that will suggest general techniques for modelling two stage differentiable games. ****
