During a decision, people tend to distort new information to make it seem more favorable to the leading alternative than it really is. The present research explores this predecisional distortion of information in several ways. First, what are its causes? Is distortion a sacrifice of decision accuracy in order to preserve consistency among all evaluations, to reduce effort, or to maintain a more positive mood based on a successful progression toward a clear decision? Alternatively, is distortion caused by using consistency as a misguided signal of accuracy? Second, what are its implications? Can manipulating the order or format (but not the content) of information influence the alternative that people choose? The answer may well be yes. Third, what are the limits of information distortion? Does it extend to the evaluation of single alternatives as well as to choices, to objective decisions, to predictions of future events, to very precise information like single numbers (e.g., prices)? Finally, how can people eliminate or at least reduce information distortion so that they do not end up choosing an inferior alternative? Will warning alone work? Does the apparatus of multiattribute utilities analysis prevent distortion? And last, does deciding in a group help (or hurt)? In many important real decisions, information is acquired sequentially (e.g., filling a job, market research, and medical diagnosis). Furthermore, organizational pressure to justify the next step in the information-gathering sequence may enhance distortion (rather than detecting biased judgment). In sum, there are material implications of the information distortion phenomenon for decision making in real, consequential situations.
