Project Abstract This proposal is for a conference on auctions and infrastructure hosted by the University of Maryland in the spring of 1998. The conference lasts two and one half days (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday). About one dozen papers are scheduled for presentation and discussion. In addition, participants discuss informally ideas during breaks and meals. An important economic development of the 1990s has been the restructuring of infrastructure industries. Throughout the world, markets are replacing monopoly, and private firms are increasingly providing goods and services that once were provided by government. Auctions are playing a major role in this restructuring. Auctions provide an efficient and transparent way for governments to privatize industries, for monopolies to divest their assets, and for scarce resources to be allocated. Applications are seen in every infrastructure industry: telecommunications (e.g., the FCC spectrum auctions), electric power, natural gas, water, air, and transportation. Treasury auctions are a related application. In the early 1990s, economists realized that existing auction theory was inadequate for these applications. Although auction theory for the sale of a single item is well developed, each of these applications involves the sale of multiple items, often with value interdependencies among items. In response, there has been a burst of research activity on auctions for multiple items. This work is theoretical, experimental, and empirical. The proposed conference will bring together about forty experts in the auction field to present and discuss their research on auctions. The conference will mix theorists, experimentalists, and empiricists. The common core will be auctions and a desire to apply auction ideas to these important real world applications. Industry experts and policy makers will also participate. The conference proceedings will be widely disseminated.
