This dissertation will document the broad-ranging changes in the 1950s wrought by the rise of solid-state electronics. This period captures the initial responses to the transistor-a solid-state electronics device developed to replace the unwieldy vacuum tube-invented in 1947 by a group of physicists at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. The transistor's invention sparked enthusiastic responses not only from rival electronics manufacturers, but also from the military and the universities. This dissertation aims to recover the foundation of the new electronics era in the complex and messy world of the 1950s, when U.S. firms began to learn the art of making the transistor. The tightly-knit structure of the "military industrial-academic complex" was a result of divergent organizational responses to the challenge of weaving the new transistor technology into pre-existing production and research relationships. A technical challenge, the mass production of a new technology, coupled with a perceived national security need, facilitated a fundamental rearrangement of the U.S. economy.
Intellectual Merits While the history of electronics has been a relatively prolific subfield within the history of science and technology, previous accounts have largely focused on either the Bell Telephone Laboratories in the late 1940s and early 50s or Silicon Valley in the 60s. This dissertation will bridge the gap in the historiography by examining the numerous links that were forged among key institutions, precisely when the foundation of the new technology was being laid throughout the 1950s. The proposal will argue that the "military-industrial-academic complex" emerged as a result of these fundamental negotiations over the new solid-state technology. It will uncover the previously unexamined, but significant participants of the postwar electronics industry. RCA, a major player in the field before the war, actively pursued an R&D program for transistors in the late 1940s. While RCA was successful in building up its solid-state technological capabilities, it ultimately failed to secure a substantial portion of the transistor market. Motorola, a relatively small and peripheral firm before the war, grew to be a leader in solid-state electronics by the 1960s. The Army Signal Corps saw enormous potential in the transistor for miniaturized communications system. While its role as patron is well known, the Signal Corps was not merely a fiscal agency, but also an active participant in the process of innovation by providing the institutional platform private firms needed to negotiate the course of technological development with one another.
Broader Impacts This dissertation has two broader implications. First, it illuminates the process of success and failure in adapting to a new technology. Especially when the fundamental "building block" of an industry changes (i.e. vacuum tubes to transistors), it is often necessary for the participants to undergo organizational change in order to reweave the relationship with one another in negotiating the new technical practice. Second, it reassesses the role of the state from a broader perspective. The postwar American state, especially the military, was at once a patron, end user, and facilitator of solid-state electronics. This viewpoint will allow us to better appreciate the role played by the state in technology-intensive industries.
